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VI. CONCLUSION 
Choper's failure to justify his normative presuppositions and 
apply his corresponding Religion Clause principles consistently is 
not unique to him; the same problems plague the Supreme 
Court's largely arbitrary and inconsistent jurisprudence in this 
area. As difficult as it is to interpret and apply the Religion 
Clauses, Choper demonstrates that it is even more difficult to as-
certain abstract fundamental principles underlying those clauses 
and apply them consistently and sensibly. Choper criticizes the 
Supreme Court's approach to state aid to schools as 
"'sacrific(ing] clarity and predictability for flexibility,"'60 (p. 176) 
but he substitutes one flexible, confusing framework for another. 
In applying Choper's principles, judges inevitably would give ef-
fect to their individual predilections, further confusing and mysti-
fying Religion Clause jurisprudence. 
In the end, Choper's work is a provocative but unpersuasive 
attempt to bring clarity and consistency to the muddled arena of 
Religion Clause jurisprudence. He understands the problems in-
volved in such an undertaking, but cannot avoid them. His pro-
ject overreaches and thus collapses under the weight of its 
laudable idealism. Choper does not provide much hope for a 
uniform interpretation of the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses. Instead, he only adds his distinctive, confusing spin to a 
rather arbitrary and ambiguous jurisprudence. 
EXPLICIT & AUTHENTIC ACTS. By David Kyvig.1 
Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. 1996. Pp. 
604. Hardcover, $55.00. 
John Vifez 
Of all the innovations of the U.S. Constitution, the process 
of providing for formal constitutional change through an amend-
ing process may be one of the most underappreciated. When 
properly functioning, such a mechanism renders violent revolu-
tion unnecessary by allowing for legal changes without the resort 
to violence. A well-constructed amending mechanism also helps 
60. Citing Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980). 
1. Professor of History, University of Akron. 
2. Chair, Department of Political Science, Middle Tennessee State University. 
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guard a constitution against temporary excitements or the addi-
tion of a profusion of trivial policy matters. 
I 
Article V of the United States Constitution provides that 
amendments must be proposed by two-thirds majorities of both 
houses of Congress and ratified by three-fourths of the states; 
alternatively, two-thirds of the states can petition Congress to 
call a constitutional convention to propose amendments.3 Before 
this process was even adopted, James Madison defended it as 
guarding "equally against that extreme facility, which would 
render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, 
which might perpetuate its discovered faults."4 Throughout its 
early history, observers generally lauded the amending process, 
and the early success of the Bill of Rights and the Eleventh and 
Twelfth Amendments undoubtedly contributed to its popularity. 
Later, the process's apparent immobility in the face of impending 
Civil War and a forty plus year hiatus from 1870 through 1912, 
during which no amendments were adopted, led to renewed 
skepticism about the procedure's efficacy. Since then, belief that 
the amending process is too easy, too difficult, or just about right 
has varied from one decade to another with the fortunes of 
amendments that have been proposed and adopted. 
Commentators have also increasingly recognized that the 
formal amending process in Article V is but one means of intro-
ducing change into the political system. For almost sixty years 
now, the Supreme Court's "shift in time that saved Nine" in the 
wake of Franklin Roosevelt's decision to attempt to pack the 
Court rather than seek amendments legitimizing the New Deal, 
has exerted particular influence on legal commentators.s 
Although the constitutional amending process has, over the 
past few years, been the subject of intense theorizing, there are 
surprisingly few good histories of the process and the twenty-
seven amendments it has produced. Three particularly stand out. 
One is Alan Grimes's,6 the second is by Richard Bernstein with 
3. U.S. Const., Art. V. 
4. Federalist 43 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 271, 278 
(Mentor, 1961). 
5. This decision is highlighted by William E. Leuchtenburg, in The Supreme Court 
Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt (Oxford U. Press, 1995), as 
well as by the book under review here. 
6. Alan P. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution (Lexington 
Books, 1978). 
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Jerome Agel,7 and the third is by George Anastaplo.s The first 
and third volumes are chiefly directed to scholars, with Grimes 
focusing on congressional debates and the theme of democratic 
progress and Anastaplo chiefly focusing on issues of original in-
tent. The second volume is written with a more popular audience 
in mind and is generally more suitable for such readers.9 
David E. Kyvig is a professor of history at the University of 
Akron who has previously treated the amending process in valu-
able books on the amendments initiating and repealing national 
alcoholic prohibition (the Eighteenth and Twenty-First)lo and in 
useful articles on the income tax amendment, the New Deal, and 
the balanced budget amendment.u With his latest book, Kyvig 
has added a volume which is, in most respects, superior to all 
three of the previous volumes on the amending process discussed 
above and others that have been written on the subject. Kyvig's 
title-Explicit & Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 
1776-1995-as well as the size of his book Gust over 600 pages), 
the length of time he devoted to researching it,12 and its publica-
tion by a scholarly press are all indications of its more compre-
hensive range and depth. While such characteristics make it 
ideal for scholars, such characteristics also make it unlikely that 
Kyvig's tome will displace Bernstein's and Agel's as the most ac-
cessible volume for general readers. 
The publication of Kyvig's book was almost simultaneous 
with the appearance of my own Encyclopedia of Constitutional 
Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues, 
7. Richard B. Bernstein and Jerome Agel, Amending America: /[We Love the Con· 
stitution So Much, Why Do We Keep Trying to Change It? (Random House, 1993). 
8. George Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution: A Commentary (Johns 
Hopkins U. Press, 1995). 
9. I omit Lester Orfield's The Amending of The Federal Constitution (U. of Michi· 
gan Press, 1942) and Russell L. Caplan's, Constitutional Brinksmanship: Amending the 
Constitution by National Convention (Oxford U. Press, 1988), both useful volumes, be-
cause the first focuses primarily on amending issues rather than amending history, and the 
second focuses almost exclusively on questions surrounding the untried Article V conven-
tion mechanism. 
10. David E. Kyvig, Repealing National Prohibition (U. of Chicago Press, 1979); 
David E. Kyvig, ed., Law, Alcohol and Order: Perspectives on National Prohibition 
(Greenwood Press, 1985). 
11. David E. Kyvig, The Road Not Taken: FDR, the Supreme Court and Constitu· 
tiona/ Amendments, 104 Pol. Science Q. 463 (1989); David E. Kyvig, Can the Constitution 
Be Amended? The Battle Over the Income Tax, 1895-1913, 20 Prologue 181 (1988); and 
David E. Kyvig, Reforming or Resisting Modem Government? The Balanced Budget 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 28 Akron L. Rev. 97 (1995). 
12. Kyvig traces the project back to 1980. See David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authen-
tic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995, xix (U. Press of Kansas, 1996). 
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1789-1995.13 As one who has recently surveyed much of the 
same scholarly territory and time period,t4 I believe I am in a 
fairly good, if somewhat awkward,ts position to assess it. 
Although I have written my volume as a series of alphabetical 
entries rather than as historical narrative, it is fascinating to see 
that both Kyvig's volume and my own give considerable attention 
to amendments that have been proposed and not ratified. My 
volume aims for breadth, with separate entries on every identifi-
able subject of proposed amendments and with additional atten-
tion to proposals to rewrite the Constitution,t6 and other issues. 
Kyvig deals only in passing with scholarly attempts to rewrite the 
Constitution and focuses only on those unratified amending pro-
posals that he thinks had widespread congressional support. 
However, those proposals that he does cover-for example, the 
Corwin Amendment (an antebellum proposal that would have 
guaranteed states the right to maintain the institution of slavery), 
the child labor amendment, the Bricker amendment (limiting 
treaty-making powers), the Ludlow Amendment (requiring a ref-
erendum on war) and amendments designed to restore prayer in 
public schools, reverse the Supreme Court's apportionment deci-
sions, give women equal rights, restrict or outlaw abortions, pro-
vide for representation for the District of Columbia, and 
guarantee a balanced federal budget-he generally covers in 
considerable depth and with scholarly insight. 
Apart from governmental studies, Kyvig's book and my own 
represent the first efforts, since historian Herman Ames's 1896 
study of the 1,736 proposed amendments introduced in the na-
tion's first one hundred years, to suggest that scholars might have 
as much to learn from amending failures as we do from amending 
successes.17 In contrast to Bernstein and Agel's volume, which 
13. John R. Vile, Encylopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amend-
ments, and Amending Issues, 1789-1995 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1996). 
14. We both cover the period through 1995. Although I chose 1789, rather than 
1776, as the starting point in my subtitle (and Kyvig's subtitle does make it seem as 
though the U.S. Constitution was amended before it was written), my book does have 
entries that cover the Revolutionary period. 
15. I say awkward because there is always the chance that poor reviews of Kyvig's 
work might help sales of my own book. Believing Kyvig's book to be a sound and useful 
one, and hoping that my own is also, I prefer to anticipate that readers of each volume 
will be stimulated to read the other. 
16. Discussions of such proposals are also found in John R. Vile, Rewriting the 
United States Constitution (Praeger, 1991) and Steven R. Boyd, Alternative Constitutions 
for the United States: A Documentary History (Greenwood Press, 1992). 
17. Herman Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States during the First Century of its History (Burt Franklin, 1970 reprint). M.A. Mus-
manno did publish a government study in 1929 on the next 1,370 proposals as Proposed 
Amendments to the Constitution (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1929), and the Li-
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by highlighting some of the more unusual amending proposals 
may convey the message that the majority of unratified amend-
ments are oddities,1s both Kyvig's volume and my own show that 
many such proposals have reflected important political concerns 
and that their discussion has been vital in clarifying America's 
self-understanding. 
II 
Kyvig's title is actually a condensed version of his central 
thesis. At a time when many scholars-led chiefly by Yale's 
Bruce Ackermanl9 and Akil Reed Amar2o-are arguing for the 
advantages and rough commensurability of extraconstitutional 
means of change with formal amendments, Kyvig, utilizing a quo-
tation from George Washington, iterates the value of formal 
amendments as "explicit and authentic acts" with unique power. 
Apparently unaware of two books in which I have discussed this 
matter in greater length,21 Kyvig early in his preface, correctly 
cites me as observing that, "(t]he more expansive role the courts 
take in interpreting and adapting the Constitution to new exigen-
cies, the less need there is for constitutional amendment, except 
perhaps as a way of reversing overly broad judicial opinions. "22 
He concludes that, like Ackerman, I have helped blur "the im-
portant distinction between a tentative, limited, and unstable 
process of constitutional elaboration and a fundamental defini-
tion of authority granted by a sovereign power."23 In chapter 6, 
"Amendments and the Judicial Review Alternative," however, 
Kyvig subsequently proceeds to note that the volume of amend-
ments "receded because the less arduous use of judicial devices 
to resolve constitutional problems increased. "24 He proceeds to 
repeat this theme throughout the chapter.2s In so doing, Kyvig 
brary of Congress has subsequently published several lists of such proposals without com-
mentary. For reference to such lists, see Vile, Encyclopedia, at ix (cited in note 13). 
18. Bernstein and Agel, Amending, at 169-98 (cited in note 7). 
19. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Belknap, 1991). 
20. See, for example, Akil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional 
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1994). 
21. See John R. Vile, Contemporary Questions Surrounding the Constitutional 
Amending Process (Praeger, 1993); John Vile, Constitutional Change in the United States: 
A Comparative Study of the Role of Constitutional Amendments, Judicial Interpretations, 
and Legislative and Executive Actions (Praeger, 1994). 
22. Kyvig, Explicit, at x (cited in note 12, citing John R. VJ.le, The Constitutional 
Amending Process in American Political Thought, 115 (Praeger, 1992) ("Constitutional 
Amending Process"). 
23. Kyvig, Explicit, at xi (cited in note 12). 
24. Id. at 112. 
25. Id. at 122-24, 127-28, and 133. 
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shows that it is often necessary to distinguish between the de-
scription of how the amending process has worked historically 
and prescriptions for its use. 
I agree with Kyvig that, although the attempt to inaugurate 
constitutional changes other than through constitutional amend-
ments is a pervasive fact of American history, it is often less than 
ideal. I have argued at length about the difficulty of ascertaining 
whether a "constitutional moment" inaugurating change through 
other means has been achieved.26 I raise this point not simply as 
a way of clarifying my own views against misinterpretation, but 
also because it points to one aspect of Kyvig's book that will 
prove frustrating for serious students of the amending process, 
especially those who attempt to keep track of the issues through 
reading current law and political science reviews. That is, while 
Kyvig's major thesis implicitly has much to say about the theories 
that Ackerman and others have advanced, Kyvig rarely does 
more than mention such authors in passing.21 Kyvig has no ex-
plicit discussion of Akil Reed Amar's much discussed theory that 
"the people" can adopt amendments through popular initiatives 
and referendums, for example. Similarly, while Kyvig mentions 
arguments by conservative legal commentators opposed to pro-
gressive amendments in the early part of this century that there 
were certain implicit limits on the amending process, he seems 
unaware that the arguments have been resurrected by liberals in 
more recent years in opposition to the flag desecration amend-
ment and others that might restrict freedom of speech and other 
civil liberties.zs 
Generally, Kyvig has mined primary sources as well as, or 
better than, any previous historian of the amending process,29 
and he does an especially good job of mentioning individuals and 
organizations that have been influential lobbying for and against 
various amendments.3o He has not kept as close a track of secon-
26. Vile, Contemporary, at 75-125 (cited in note 21). 
27. Fortunately, many such authors and critics may be found in Sanford Levinson, 
ed., Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment 
(Princeton U. Press, 1995). 
28. See, for example, Eric Alan Isaacson, The Flag Burning Issue: A Legal Analysis 
and Comment, 23 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 535 (1990), and Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning 
Amendment Unconstitutional? 100 Yale L.J. 1073 (1992). 
29. Ames's 1896 volume was arguably a comparable study, especially for its time. 
30. Many recent books on the Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and other individual amend-
ments and proposed amendments have done this, but few books, other than Clement 
Vose's Constitutional Change: Amendment Politics and Supreme Court Litigation Since 
1900 (D.C. Heath and Company, 1972) have attempted to do this for a whole series of 
such proposals. Major individuals and organizations are treated in my Encyclopedia 
(cited in note 13), but not in the same depth or breadth as in Kyvig's volume. 
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dary commentary, especially that over the past decade or so. 
Kyvig's otherwise solid exposition of the flag-desecration amend-
ment controversy does not note recent books by the most prolific 
and comprehensive student of the subject.31 Despite another ex-
cellent analysis of the prayer in school proposals, one will not 
find mention of the contemporary religious equality amendments 
that have recently usurped the earlier discussion of prayer in 
school and divided religious supporters.32 Similarly, Kyvig gives 
no indication that a victim's rights amendment, first introduced 
in 1990, has been resurrected33 and has indeed, since both our 
books went to galleys, subsequently been endorsed by both Pres-
ident Clinton and former Senator Dole. Although Kyvig's back-
ground as an historian served him well in locating some solid 
sources on the Ludlow, or war-referendum, amendment that I 
missed,34 Kyvig has in tum missed political scientist Thomas 
Cronin's book tying this amendment to similar proposed initia-
tives in other time periods.3s 
Although Kyvig's book does a better job than any other 
chronological history of the amending process in tying develop-
ments in amending history to political theory, he focuses primar-
ily on the amendments themselves and makes some surprising 
omissions. The analogy, possibly coined by Joseph Story, liken-
ing the amending process to a "safety valve" repeatedly surfaces 
in early discussions of the amending process36 but does not, un-
less I have missed it, appear in Kyvig's book. Similarly, although 
Kyvig does a good job covering the proposals that emerged at the 
beginning and end of the U.S. Civil War, he neither discusses Sid-
ney George Fisher's novel advocacy of amending the U.S. Con-
stitution, like the English, through legislative enactmenP7 nor 
John A. Jameson's great contribution to the study of constitu-
31. Robert J. Goldstein, Burning the Flag: The Great 1989-1990 American Flag Des· 
ecration Controversy (Kent State U. Press, 1995), and Saving 'Old Glory': The History of 
the Flag Desecration Controversy (Westview, 1995). 
32. Vile, Encyclopedia at 252-54 (cited in note 13). There have been developments 
on this even since I wrote my own entry. See Dan Carney, School Prayer Delayed by 
GOP Squabbles, 54 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2529 (1996). 
33. Vile, Encyclopedia at 336 (cited in note 13). 
34. Kyvig, Explicit at 316-25 (cited in note 12). See especially, Ernest C. Bolt, Jr., 
Ballots Before Bullets: The War Referendum Approach to Peace in America, 1914·1941 (U. 
Press of Va., 1977) and Walter R. Griffin, Louis Ludlow and the War Referendum Cru· 
sade, 1935·1941, 64 Ind. Mag. Hist. 267 (1968). 
35. Thomas Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and 
Recall (Harvard U. Press, 1989). 
36. Vile, Contemporary at 79 (cited in note 21). 
37. Sidney George Fisher, The Trial of the Constitution (Da Capo Press: 1972 reprint 
of 1862 edition). 
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tiona! conventions in the nineteenth century.3s Similarly, 
although it relates directly to Kyvig's central thesis, he neither 
discusses Christopher Tiedeman's subsequent discussion of 
America's "unwritten Constitution,"39 nor Herbert Horwill's dis-
cussion of customs and usages,40 nor Michael Foley's more recent 
discussion of constitutional "abeyances."41 
Kyvig certainly goes into much greater depth on individual 
amendments that have been adopted than either I was able to do 
in my Encyclopedia or most previous writers have done, but 
there are some curious omissions. In discussing a proposal in the 
early nineteenth century to prohibit titles of nobility, Kyvig 
seems unaware of research that suggests that this proposal was 
aimed to prevent the son of Napoleon Bonaparte's brother, Je-
rome, and Baltimore socialite Elizabeth Patterson Bonaparte, 
from claiming an American throne.42 Although Kyvig points out 
that President Lincoln signed the Thirteenth Amendment,43 an 
action not authorized or required by Article V, he does not men-
tion that President Buchanan had previously signed the unsuc-
cessful Corwin Amendment.44 Similarly, although Kyvig 
discusses in considerable detail the problems addressed by the 
Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for the direct election 
of U.S. Senators, he neither addresses criticisms that the amend-
ment has undermined deliberation and undercut the role of the 
states in the federal system, nor does he cite the most recent 
book on the subject.4s 
38. John Alexander Jameson, A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions; Their His-
tory, Powers, and Modes of Proceeding (Callaghan and Company, 4th ed. 1887). 
39. Christopher G. Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution of the United States (G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1890). 
40. Herbert W. Horwill, The Usages of the American Constitution (Kennikat Press, 
1969 reprint of 1925 edition). 
41. Michael Foley, The Silence of Constitutions: Gaps, 'Abeyances' and Political 
Temperament in the Maintenance of Government (Routledge, 1989). 
42. W.H. Earle, The Phantom Amendment & the Dutchess of Baltimore, 22 Am. 
Hist. Ill. 32-39 (1987). This issue is assuming increased importance as various far-right 
wing groups have alleged that the amendment was adopted and designed to prohibit law-
yers who have graduated from law school from serving in government: their fairly implau-
sible theory is that the title "esquire" is a prohibited title of nobility. For an articulation 
of this view, see John E. Trumane, Esquires, at http/www.supremelaw.comllibrary/ 
esquires.html. 
43. Kyvig, Explicit at 162 (cited in note 12). 
44. Bernstein and Agel, Amending at 91 (cited in note 7). 
45. C.H. Hoebeke, The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the Seven-
teenth Amendment (Transaction Publishers, 1995). 
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III 
There are some real gems in Kyvig's discussion. His analysis 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as a cluster of proposals-as op-
posed to the Bill of Rights where proposals were grouped in sep-
arate amendments-while arguably underestimating the manner 
in which some of the first ten amendments combine more than 
one proposal,46 is helpful in explaining and understanding some 
of the interpretative dilemmas that have subsequently plagued 
the Fourteenth.47 Kyvig includes ironic stories of how some legis-
lators' assessments of the amending process have backfired. 
Thus, Senator Nelson Aldrich approved the Sixteenth Amend-
ment believing it would never be adopted; then-Senator Warren 
G. Harding helped add a time limit to the Eighteenth Amend-
ment thinking such a time limit would defeat it; and Senator 
Howard Smith's seeming guile in adding sex to the list of charac-
teristics that would be federally protected ultimately provided a 
legal basis for women's rights4s and may have indirectly helped 
stimulate concern for the Equal Rights Amendment. Similarly, I 
found Kyvig's discussion of the Equal Rights Amendment to be 
enlightening and entertaining, if not altogether dispassionate in 
its zest for pointing to some of the apparent misrepresentations 
made by the amendment's opponents.49 Contrary to many such 
accounts, Kyvig argues that North Carolina Democratic Senator 
Sam Ervin should get as much, or more, credit for stopping the 
amendment as does Phyllis Schlafly. Kyvig also successfully 
highlights the role that former Indiana Senator Birch Bayh 
played not only in the successful adoption of the Twenty-Fifth 
but also in unsuccessful proposals for direct election of the presi-
dent and other amendments. 
Kyvig repeatedly cites contemporary polls to track support 
for, or opposition to, the proposals he discusses, and he ties pop-
ular reverence for the Constitution, which other commentators 
have noted,so at least in part to the fact that members of the first 
46. Amar has argued that the Framers of the Bill of Rights exercised "clever bun-
dling" by combining popular guarantees with less popular ones in the same amendment. 
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale LJ. 1131, 1181-82 
(1991). 
47. Kyvig, Explicit at 167 (cited in note 12). 
48. Id. at 202, 223-24, and 402. 
49. I think Kyvig somewhat underestimates the degree to which opponents had been 
given ammunition for such false claims by the way that the amendment's proponents 
often expressed willingness to allow the courts to resolve issues over its meaning rather 
than spelling them out in congressional debates. 
50. Especially Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself" The Constitu-
tion in American Culture (Alfred A. Knopf, 1986). 
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Congress decided to add amendments as supplements to the 
Constitution rather than integrating them into the original text. 
The irony is that James Madison, who had proposed integrating 
amendments into the constitutional text rather than as ad-
dendums to the text,s1 was the individual who had argued so 
forcefully in Federalist No. 49 for the value of constitutional 
veneration.sz 
Kyvig successfully integrates most Supreme Court decisions 
relative to the amending process into his narrative, but, as in 
other areas, he rarely addresses whether he thinks the decisions 
have been wise. Kyvig does indicate that he thinks the idea of 
"contemporary consensus" that the Court articulated in Dillon v. 
Glosss3 was "a twentieth-century innovation not explicit in the 
thinking of the Founders, "54 whereas I believe such a notion is 
fully implicit in the idea of government by consent that the 
amending process embodies. Kyvig does not address the Court's 
treatment of most amending issues since Coleman v. Millers as 
"political questions," an issue that has engendered special con-
troversys6 and which would have been especially worthy of 
comment. 
IV 
Especially because of its length, Kyvig's book would profit 
from some well-chosen appendices. A copy of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, or at the very least, its amendments, would serve to clarify 
some points that are unclear in the narrative, as would the texts 
of the major unsuccessful amendments that he discusses.57 In at 
least one case-that of the amendment, originally proposed as 
part of the Bill of Rights, relative to congressional representa-
tion-a copy of the proposal's text would make it obvious that 
the amendment, if in effect today, would not, as Kyvig suggests, 
51. Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling, and Charlene Bangs Bickford, eds., Creat-
ing the Bill of Rights 109 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1991). 
52. Federalist 49 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 313 
(Mentor, 1961). Madison had noted that "as every appeal to the people would carry an 
implication of some defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in a great mea-
sure, deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows on everything, and 
without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite 
stability." Id. at 314. 
53. 256 u.s. 368 (1921). 
54. Kyvig, Explicit at 468 (cited in note 12). 
55. 307 u.s. 433 (1939). 
56. See especially Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Re-
thinking the Amendment Process, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 386 (1983). 
. 57.. All the other three prior books on amendments, as well as my own Encyclopedia 
(clled m note 13), have one or more appendices. 
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"transform the current House of Representatives into a very dif-
ferent institution"ss but would simply be irrelevant.s9 Kyvig is to 
be praised for including fairly extensive end notes, bibliogra-
phies, and an index, although the latter would have been im-
proved if it had entries for individual amendments by number. 
As narrative, Kyvig's story begins slowly-with an introduc-
tory chapter on constitutionalism that at times seems only tan-
gentially related to the amending process-but, although the 
book is long, it is sound and generally engaging. Kyvig shows 
that, when popular opinion is mobilized and consensus is 
reached, amendments can be, and have been, successfully 
adopted. He also demonstrates that most attempts to show that 
the amending process can be used by sparsely populated states to 
thwart popular majorities are bugaboos and that "(t]he federal 
system has not significantly distorted the Article V consensus 
equation. "60 Often those advocates of amendments who criticize 
the process have failed in their own efforts to mobilize popular 
support. 
If, as I believe, Kyvig is basically correct, it is to be hoped 
that his volume will lead to renewed appreciation of the amend-
ing process and to the Founder's defense of it as a golden mean 
between excessive ease and difficulty.6t Perhaps this volume will 
also redirect attention to the possibilities inherent in this mecha-
nism, and somewhat away from the plethora of modern propos-
als to use judicial interpretations to short-circuit popular 
discussion and bypass the formal enactment of constitutional 
change. 
58. Kyvig, Explicit at 480 (cited in note 12). 
59. The amendment provided that, after congressional representation in the House 
of Representatives reached 200, "the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that 
there shall not be Jess than two hundred Representatives, nor more than one Representa-
tive for every fifty thousand persons." Anastaplo, Amendments at 327 (cited in note 8). 
Under such a formula, Congress could continue at its current size. 
60. Kyvig, Explicit at 475 (cited in note 12). Kyvig is supported on this point by 
William S. Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change 244-45 (Clarendon Press, 
1956). 
61. Robert H. Bork's new book Slouching Towards Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism 
and American Decline, 117-18 (Regan Books, 1996), proposes that Congress should be 
able to reverse Supreme Court decisions by a majority vote of both Houses. Although 
not new (see Vile, Congress, Overriding Judicial Decisions, in Encyclopedia at 69-70 (cited 
in note 13)), a fact Bork himself acknowledges, the proposal seems to reflect a lack of 
faith in the current process. 
